The porter problem in ecological economics: Solar battery recycling in rural electrification

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Outline of this presentation

- Main topic
- Research approach
- Model
- 4 Scenario analysis

Explanation of the topic

• We propose a model for analysing an incentive compatibility problem in solid waste recycling.

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- We sketch a case study in Nepal, where rural electrification through solar home systems leads to the dumping of used batteries.
- Main idea: Rethink policies that facilitate the introduction of aggressive solid waste in markets with an imperfect physical and institutional infrastructure.

Research approach

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- We come up with a number of necessary conditions for an incentive-compatible contract that encourages people to hand in dead batteries.
- We sketch the reality content of the model by means of a case study about solar home systems (SHSs) in Humla, Nepal.
- Since at present no battery recycling system exists in Nepal, our analysis is based on three scenarios.
- In each scenario, NGOs may help to monitor or even maintain SHSs, or facilitate recycling.

Case background

Our case is located in Humla, a remote and poor district.

• Example of community.

Case background



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• Properly installed SHSs.

Case background



Case background

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 Battery abuse → Short lifespan.

Case background




Case background



Case background

Case background



Case background

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• Example of properly installed SHSs.

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 Proper battery installation → Longer lifespan.

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Model (1)

We first assume symmetric information, equal environmental impact. Principal minimises expenditures:

$$\min_{\{(\overline{p},q);(p,q)\}} \Theta(q) - \left(\overline{p}\overline{\lambda} + \underline{p}\underline{\lambda}\right)q \tag{1}$$

subject to the agent's participation constraints:

$$p - \underline{C}(q, \underline{\lambda}) \ge 0,$$
 (a)

$$p - \overline{C}(q, \underline{\lambda}) \ge 0,$$
 (b)

$$\overline{p} - \underline{C}(q, \overline{\lambda}) \ge 0,$$
 (c)

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 (d)

and the incentive compatibility constraints:

$$\overline{p} - \overline{C}(q, \overline{\lambda}) \ge p - \overline{C}(q, \underline{\lambda}),$$
 (e)

$$\overline{p} - \overline{C}(q, \overline{\lambda}) \ge \overline{p} - \underline{C}(q, \overline{\lambda}),$$
 (f)

Model (2)

- We then gradually introduce asymmetric information, and allow the solid waste to have a different environmental impact (e.g., remote areas larger environmental impact than areas nearby collection or recycling facility).
- Track records of the whereabouts of the solar PV batteries are of course crucial. Battery monitoring programmes are often lacking, particularly in remote areas (where ecosystems are often most delicate).
- Yet, even under symmetric information on battery conditions, recycling may not take place due to budget constraints of the principal.

Scenario analysis

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- Laissez faire: Unpredictable, huge risk of environmental damage.
- NGO monitors: Good basis for setting up recycling programme.
- NGO monitors & collects: Fairly predictable outcome, reduced environmental risk.

Summary

- In this paper, we have expressed our concern about policies that facilitate the introduction of aggressive toxic solid waste into delicate ecosystems.
- We propose a model that clarifies the incentive (in)compatibility of the various contracts.
- Given a case study analysis, we propose how an incentive compatible collection & recycling programme may look like.